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LOCAL-INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE POWER
TO PROHIBIT COMMERCE
James Barclay Smith*

The purpose of this discussion is to observe some of the developments of
the national regulatory power. It will greatly simplify our consideration if we
can maintain the perspective of observing the issue in terms of adjustments of
government to the needs of the governed and thus escape whatever contentiousness might arise on the question of the propriety of expansion of classification
for regulatory purposes. (Nor are we particularly concerned with state and
national capacity for cooperative action.) I Whether or not a particular business
or industry has become so affected with the public interest will thus arise only
collaterally in our inquiry. It must also be borne in mind that ours is a government intended to endure through the ages with the capacity to meet various
crises as they may arise'-an efficient, permanent government, with the duty
of self-preservation. 2 The concept of government is here used generically and
comprehends the form of the American government. Our government is not
a single all-powerful government, as for example the British Parliament, but is
a bicameral system of two distinct types of sovereigns.' While there are thus
*Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kansas School of Law, Lawrence, Kan. B.S., L.L.B., J.S.D. Member of the bar of Kansas, New York, and of the Supreme Court of the United States. Assoc.
prof. of law, Louisiana State Univ., 1928-1929; prof. of law 1929-1935; prof. of law, Univ. of
Kansas, 1935- . Member of the American Law Institute. Valuation attorney, Interstate Commerce Commission, June 1931, to Feb., 1932. Valuation expert counsel, Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, Feb. to Aug., 1932. Author of "Some Phases of Fair Value
and Interstate Rates," 1932; "A Child Labor Amendment Is Unnecessary," California Law Review,
November, 1938; "Non-Judicial Administration of Law," University of Cincinnati Law Review,
November, 1938.
1Cf. J. B. Smith, A Child Labor Amendment is Unnecessary, California Law Review (Nov.
1938).
laThe powers of the national government were granted "in a constitution intended to endure
for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCullouch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
2
"Government, federal and state, each in its own sphere owes a duty to the people within its
jurisdiction to preserve itself in adequate strength to maintain peace and order and to assure the
/ just enforcement of law." Hamilton v. Regents, etc., 293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197 (1934).
$Cf. M. Paul Reynaud, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, former Minister of Justice,
/ Minister of Finance, and Minister of the Colonies, Comparison of French and American judiciary
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necessarily mutually exclusive theaters of. operation, if our system is not to be
the victim of an hiatus in pattern, the sum of the two must be equal to the
4
occasion.
We are particularly concerned with the commerce clause. Perspective for
approach to our subject, namely, the scope of the regulatory power of the nation
over commercial intercourse, requires that some examination be made of the
conditions existent at the time the provisions were written into the fundamental
law. Under the Confederacy prior to the creation of our present system, the
Systems, 1 Federal Bar Ass'n. Jour. 28 (Oct. 1932): "You know that under our former regime,
when we had Kings, France was divided into provinces and that these provinces had their own
laws, just as your States have here.
"Well, the French philosophers of the 18th century, the encyclopedists, said to those
provinces: 'Keep your own styles, your own habits, your old songs, even your own dialects, but
there must be only one law for the whole country. What is right is right for everybody. France
is a nation. The nation's power must not be broken up in pieces; no legal barriers must exist on
the soil of the country. The blood must flow freely in the nation's body.'
"They added: 'We know that there are different matrimonial regimes which govern property
rights. We know that, in the South, Roman law prevails while in the North the Gallic common
law'holds good. Well, let us leave things as they are. Let the national law provide those two
matrimonial regimes and let the people choose between them.
"Of course these were revolutionary ideas. As you remember, it took more time, in those
days, to go from Paris to Marseilles than it takes today to go from New York to San Francisco
even by rail. Moreover, the French spoke various dialects. So the idea of the legal unification
of France, at that time, was much bolder than the present idea of the unification of your different
laws, here in America. But there must have been something good in those ideas as they won
the victory.
"Only revolutionists could carry them out. The great French revolution did it. Such a
reform played a most important part in the formation of the united country that France is today.
The architecture of the legal and judiciary systems has not been modified since, so that while you
have here 49 legislative bodies, including the Federal Congress, we have one: the French Parliament which is divided into two Houses: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
"You have 49 judiciary bodies. We have one. The head of this body is our Attorney
General or Minister of Justice.
"You have 49 jurisprudence bodies. We have one, imposed upon all the French tribunals
by a 4 Supreme Court, dealing only with the application of the law, our Court of Cassation."
"Nor did the formation of an indestructible Union of indestructible States make impossible
cooperation between the Nation and the States through the exercise of the power of each to the
advantage of the people who are citizens of both. We had recent occasion to consider that
question in the case of Steward Machine Company v. Davis, supra, in relation to the operation
of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-1305. The
questior) was rai fd with special emphasis in relation to section 904 of the statute, 42 U. S. C. A.
§§ 1103, complementary thereto, by which the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to receive
and hold in the Unemployment Trust Fund all moneys deposited therein by a state agency for a
state unemployment fund and to invest in obligations of the United States such portion of the
Fund as is not in his judgment required to meet current withdrawals. The contention was that
Alabama in consenting to that deposit had 'renounced the plenitude of power inherent in her
statehood.' 301 U. S. 548, at pages 595, 596, 57 S. Ct. 883, 895, 81 L. Ed. 1279. We found
the contention to be unsound. As the States were at liberty upon obtaining the consent of
Congress to make agreements with one another, we saw no room for doubt that they may do the
like with Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without impairment. And we
added that: 'Nowhere in our scheme of government-in the limitations express or implied of our
Federal Constitution-do we find that she (the State) is prohibited from assenting to conditions
that will assure a fair and just requital for benefits received'." United States v. Bekins, 58 S.
Ct. 811, 816 (1938).
It is quite possible, however, for a state constitution to preclude the state or municipal
government from entering specified activities, which so doing would violate no right protected
by the national constitution if performed by local government; an'd which because of their
peculiarly local nature they cannot be treated by the general government.
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several states bore an international relationship to each other. The Articles
themselves recognized that each state was "sovereign" to itself, and that "The
States severally enter into a firm league of friendship." 6 The resulting league
had no effective national personality. A connotation commonly applied to foreign
diplomats was applied to the representatives of the states. The impotence, or
more properly the absence of a common government resulted, through practices
of the states, in chaotic conditions. These practices were the reflection of provincialism upon international jealousy. Spite was expressed in cumulative discriminations and sanctions in which the vehicles of industry were mired, and
war, civil and international, was imminent. In particular, contracts were repudiated, remedy was denied to rights of non-residents, and imports from other
states were discriminated against. From these come the clauses which made us
a nation-the contract clause, the privileges and immunities clause, the full faith
and credit clause, and the commerce clause. But more important in the operating
plan than merely defining what jurisdiction it would be well for the common
denominator government to have, that government was given the vital force and
affirmative duty to serve the common purpose of the whole people." The occasion for national action was left to the determination of the common government. The oversight of this elementary characteristic of the plan is the cause of
much confusion. Though the jurisdictional fact, or the factual justification for
national action, exists, the initiative to action lies in the congressional discretion.
For the misuse of that discretion, within the legislative power, whether by nonaction or excessive action, the legislators must answer at the polls and not at
the bar.
In an industrial order, turgidity and tone of the economic body are essential
to health. The arteries of commerce of the Confederacy were tapped by the
leecherous tariffs of the states. The purpose of the commerce clause was to
withdraw from the states the capacity for economic isolation, 8 and conversely to
give to and impose upon the general government the affirmative duty to flush the
channels of commerce among the states and to direct their courses in the common
good. Of the great nation-making clauses, the commerce clause was not the
least important in 1787. 9 It now exerts the greatest cohesive force in national
Art.
63d Art.
7
"The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation
depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as
human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confiding
the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt
any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end." McCullouch v. Maryland,
.rupra note 1.
8"What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not
place itself in a position of economic isolation." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 527, 55 S.
52d

Ct. 497 (1935).
9"The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which
the people of America adopted their government . . ." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6. L.
Ed. 23 (1824).
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integration. The reason for the bicameral system was to give to the central
government the problems common to the several states, but those problems not
common but peculiar only to the internal affairs of a state were never divested
10
Differences of opinion were
from the several states. So it is with commerce.
many and some were strong. But the outlined division cannot be denied as the
obvious course of a naturally and already unified people in the political genesis
from a mere "league of friendship" of the several states to a supreme common
executive government in a representative democracy.
It was on the issue of whether to create such a central government that the
division lay before the Constitution was adopted. Afterwards it was on its interpretation. The positions of the respective supporters of Virginia and New
Jersey plans continued hostile, one finding support in the second clause of the
Sixth Article, and the other in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. In passing,
the aggressiveness of the Federalist Party in promoting centralizing legislation
and its down-fall in the Alien and Sedition Acts should be noted. Its control
for the first twelve years of the new government was followed by some sixty
years of control by a party which was hostile to the development of the powers
of the central government at the 'expense of the states. However, one of the
last official acts of President Adams was the appointment of Chief Justice Marshall. The inevitable trend was continuous. The exertion of national powers
over commerce has always increased in activity. 1 Inevitable because with improved communication and transportation the amount of business among the
states increased, and the increase required more and more supervision in the promotion of common welfare. With the trans-state line increase in importance
of the problem arises the increasing responsibility of initiative of the national
government. When the mal-adjustment exceeds the capacity for correction by
10"The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce among the several States.
The word among means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with
them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but
may be introduced into the interior.
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely
internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of
the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would he
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
"Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce
which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been
selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for
that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was
to be extended, would not have been made, had the intention been to extend the power to every
description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns
which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular
State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for
the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely
internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the Staid itself." Ibid,
(Italics added).
"2Cf. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1871).
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piece-meal treatment by the states, the responsibility of the central government
must be translated into action or our federal plan is incompetent to treat where
treatment is necessary to the general welfare. In the recent case of Helvering v.
Davis12 the Court described the factual transition from local to common aspect
as follows: "The problem is plainly national in area and dimensions. Moreover,
laws of separate states cannot deal with it effectively. Congress, at least, had
a basis for that belief."
It has often been said that the commerce clause was of relatively little
importance for the first eighty years of national life. This wholly fails to appreciate the significance of the clause in correlation with the conditions of the
times. In the first place the temper of our people for a long period after the
Revolution was not one which welcomed governmental interference in any form.
It has already been pointed out that the power to prohibit normal interstate commerce was withdrawn from the states by the commerce clause. Thus though
Congress remained inactive, the commerce clause automatically became the most
powerful catalytic agency in the promotion of national homogeneity. When the
conditions preceding and following the adoption of the Constitution are compared this is obvious.' s The dearth of litigation in the early periods is most
4
instructive.1
The examination of a law in vacuo without a careful consideration of the
purpose of the legislator is a futile thing. That what is said by the legislature
must be considered in terms of what was sought to be achieved is an elementary
rule of construction. In constitutional provisions in particular the nature of the
problem dealt with and the public policy promoted by the fundamental law in
terms of the various crises which confront the government are paramount. These
we must briefly consider. In the first place it is to Congress, and not to the
judiciary, that the Constitution gives the power to regulate commerce with for12301 U. S. 619, 644, 57 S. Ct. 9o4 (1937).
3
1 "Pending a grant of power to Congress over matters of commerce, the states acted individually. A uniform policy was necessary, and while a pretense was made of acting in unison to
achieve a much desired end, it is evident that selfish motives frequently dictated what was done.
Any state which enjoyed superior conditions to a neighboring state was only too apt to take
advantage of that fact. Some of the states, as James Madison described it, 'having no convenient

ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, through whose ports
their commerce was carried on. New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was
likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina,
to a patient bleeding at both arms.' The Americans were an agricultural and a trading people.
Interference with the arteries of commerce was cutting off the very lifeblood of the nation, and
something had to be done. The articles of confederation provided no remedy, and it was evident
that amendments to that document, if presented in the ordinary way, were not likely to succeed.
Some other method of procedure was necessary." Description of conditions under the Confederacy by MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION, (1913), page 7.
Of course the commerce clause is not the only provision devoted to correction of previous conditions. 4
1 Prior to 1840 there had been only five cases before the Supreme Court, and only fortyeight in the lower federal courts; by 1860, twenty and one hundred and sixty-four; by 1880,
seventy-seven; by 1890, one hundred and forty-eight, and eight hundred; by 1900, nearly two
hundred, and nearly fifteen hundred. Now nearly every issue invites its application. PRENTICE
AND EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1898).
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eign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. The
courts can never take the initiative on this subject. 15 To regulate, in the sense
intended, is to foster, protect, control, and restrain, with appropriate regard for
the welfare of those who are immediately concerned and of the public at large.16
It includes the power to prohibit in cases where such prohibition is in aid of the
lawful protection of the public. 17 While it has no liniitations other than those
prescribed in the Constitution, it does not carry with it the right to destroy or
impair those limitations and guaranties which appear in the body of the Constitu18
tion and in the amendments.
Where no common problem was involved no jurisdiction was intended to
be given to the federal government. The power of Congress extends only to
external commerce of the states and reaches the interior of a state only so far
as may be necessary to protect the products of other states from discrimination
by reason of their foreign origin.' 9 The power of Congress has no application
to commerce which is purely internal.20 The grant virtually denies the power tc
interfere in the internal trade and business of the separate states, 21 except as a
necessary and proper means of carrying into execution some other power expressly
granted.22 It extends to acts done on land which interfere with the due ex'ercise of the power to regulate commerce, including navigation.23 The phrase
"among the several states" marks the distinction, for the purpose of national
governmental regulation, between commerce which concerns two or more states,
15Parkersburg,
etc. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 2 S. Ct. 737 (1883).
6
1 Mondou v. New York etc., 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169 (1912). Cf. Texas etc. R. Co.
v. Brotherhood, etc. 281 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427 (1930); Virginia Railroad Co. v. System
Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592 (1937) ; National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937); Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937).
17Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321 (1903); Hoke v. United States, 227
U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281 (1913).
Cf. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 18 S. Ct. 664 (1898) ;
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25 (1898) ; Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 20 S. Ct. 96 (1899) ; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S.
137, 23 S. Ct. 92 (1902) ; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364 (1911) ;
Caminette v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192 (1912) ; Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S.
325, 36 S. Ct. 131 (1915); Clark, etc. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct.
180 (1917); Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 56 S. Ct. 395 (1925).
18United States v. Joint Traffic Association, supra note 17. Cf. Monongahela Nay. Co. v.
United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336, 13 S. Ct. 622 (1893) ; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brinson,
154 U. S. 447, 479, 14 S. Ct. 1125 (1894) ; Dayton Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263
U. S. 456, 44 S. Ct. 169 (1924); Greanleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251,
35 S.9Ct. 551 (1915).
' The Daniel Ball, supra note 11; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 25 L. Ed. 743 (1880).
20Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 9; United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wheaton 41 (1870); Lord
v. Goodall, etc., Co., 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. Ed. 224 (1881); Nichol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509,
19 S.
2 1 Ct. 522 (1899).
llinois, etc. R. Co. v. McKeendree 203 U. S. 514, 27 S. Ct. 153 (1906).
22B. & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Comm. Comm., 221 U. S. 612, 31 S. Ct. 621 (1911); So.
R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2 (1911); H. E. & W. T. R. Co. v. UnitedStates, 234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833 (1914); I. C. R. Co. v. P. U. Comm., 245 U. S. 4,93,
38 S. Ct. 170 (1918); Railroad Comm. v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232
(1922).
23United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters 72 (1838).
Cf. Pacfic Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2
Wall. 450, 459 (1865) and Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 9.

DICKINSON

L4W

REVIEW

and commerce which is confined to a single state and does not affect the other
states, the power to regulate the former being conferred upon Congress and the
24
regulation of the latter remaining unaffected in the states severally.
It may be well before going further to notice the difference in the functions
of the national government under the three categories of the commerce clause,
namely, normal internal national commerce, commerce with the Indian tribes, and
international commerce. The last two have a very different measure of jurisdiction than the first. Among the nations of the world the United States must be
able to treat with full equality. That bargaining equialent would be lacking
if the sovereignty of the United States were incomplete, were divided. In the
commerce within the territory of the United States, the sovereignty is divided,
but that is within the family. Singleness of personality was essential if one
people through a central government were "to assume among the powers of the
earth the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God entitles them." Failure to recognize this inherent difference in the stature
of the sovereign with authority only to adjust family differences, and the one
incarnated to take no quarter in international affairs has caused needless confusion.
Our only concern here is to note that one is not the measure of the other. Two
recent cases involving the international sovereignty of the United States should be
noted before return to our subject, namely, Burnet v. Brooks,21 and United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.26

In the latter case the Court said:

"The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their origin and their
nature. The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers
except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers
as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary
purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative
pow.drs then possessed by tlistates such portions as it was thought desirable to
vest in the federal goyernment, leaving those not included in the enumeration
still in the states. That this doctrine applies only to powers which the states
had is self-evident. And since the states severally never possessed international
powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers
but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source . ..
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon affirmative grants of the Constitution
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in
origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited . . .As a result of
the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the powers
24Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 9; Mondou v. N. Y., N. H., & H. R. Co., supra note 16.
25288 U. S. 378, 53 S. Ct. 457 (1933).
26299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216 (1936).
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of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but
to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
America."27
The third category of the clause, giving jurisdiction ovrer commerce with the
I-idian rribes, as that over international commerce, carries with it powers which
make the extent of national control there no test of that control over ordinary
internal commerce among the states. The Indians are the wards of the United
States. It has special treaty-making powers in addition to practically uncontrolled
28
legislative discretion. These and others are added to the commerce power.
We may now return to the problem immediately before us, the scope of the
regulatory power of Congress over internal commerce. In so doing it is necessary
to trace briefly the development of the underlying principle. It was vigorously
contended after the adoption of the Constitution that the national commerce
power was only concurrent and not exclusive anywhere. The issue first came
before the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden.29 The case grew out of a grant by the
legislature of New York to Robert L. Livingston and Robert Fulton of the exclusive right of navigation in all the waters within the jurisdiction of the state,
with boats by fire and steam, and the authorization of the state courts to enjoin
any other person whatever from navigating such waters with boats of this description. The act was assailed by the appellant in the case as unconstitutional,
as being in violation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce. The
decision of the particular question involved in the case was not a difficult one.
In spite of the decision of the highest court of the state, 30 awarding the injunction
asked against the infringement of the monopoly by a federal licensee, it was
21Congress has always exercised plenary power in respect to the exclusion of merchandise
brought from foreign countries, not only by direction by the enactment of embargo statutes, but
indirectly as a necessary result of provisions contained in tariff legislation. It has also in other
than tariffs, exerted a police power over foreign commerce by provisions which of themselves
amounted to the assertion of the right to exclude merchandise at discretion. Cf. Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349 (1904) and University of Illinois v. United States,
289 U. S. 48, 53 S. Ct. 509 (1933).
See also Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton 419 (1827).
2
SCherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Peters 515
(1832).
United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886): "From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.
This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this Court, whenever
the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that Government,
because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone
can enforce its laws on all the tribes."
29Supra note 9.
3
0"It is supported by great names-by names which have all the titles to consideration that
virtue, intelligence, and office, can bestow. No tribunal can approach the decision of this question,
without feeling a just and real respect for that opinion which is sustained by such authority; but
it is the province of this court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly; and the Judges must
exercise, in the examination of the subject, that understanding which Providence has bestowed
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evident that if a state could pass laws of this character, the control of Congress
over interstate commerce was a myth. The act was held an unconstitutional intrusion upon the national jurisdiction. But a sweeping generalization was made
to the effect that the power of Congress was not only supreme but all-exclusive
so that legislation by any state on a subject matter of interstate commerce was
prohibited. The decisions soon began to delimit the exclusive area of national
power. 3 1 The lodestones were established, in the since unquestioned division,
by the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port." The case distinguished between regulations of commerce in which uniformity throughout
the United States is desirable and those regulations which, being local in their
nature, may properly admit of variations in different places to meet varying local
conditions. As to the first class of regulations, the Court affirmed the rule of
Gibbons v. Ogden; as to the second class, it held that in the absence of federal
statutes the different states might legislate for their own territory. The dividing
lines were drawn by the following often repeated and since never questioned
language: "The diversities of opinion, therefore, which have existed on this subject, have arisen from the different views taken of the nature of this power. But
when the nature of a power like this is spoken of, when it is said that the nature
of the power requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it must
be intended to refer to the subjects of that power, and to say they are of such
a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Now the power to
regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding
a single uniform rule, operating 'equally on the commerce of the United States
in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
"Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this power requires
exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects
of this power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is really applicable but
to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit
only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be. of
such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot
be affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain."
It must be noted that two divisions of commerce were created by the Cooley
Case. These are the special concern of this discussion, but before we go on, it
must be repeated that there is a field not described in the famous statement above

upon them, with that independence which the people of the United States expect from this department of the government ....
Oh, that the accolade of official virtue thus expressed by The Great Chief Justice might be
the inspiration of decisional courage by all public officers, administrative as well as judicial.
81Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, 2 Peters 245 (1829); New York v. Miln,
11 Peters 102 (1837); The License Cases, 5 Howard 504 (1867).
8212 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851).
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quoted. It is the theater of commercial activities having no connection with other
states and being conducted exclusively within a state. Even though the commerce
clause undergo the broadest possible interpretation the national regulatory power
will never extend to all commerce within the territory of the United States. "If
centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the forces that oppose and
counteract them, there will be an end to our federal system. I find no authority
in that grant (the commerce clause) for the regulation of wages and the hours
of labor in the intrastate transactions . . . As to this feature of the case, little can
be added to the opinion of the Court. There is a view of causation that would
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce . . . Activities local in their immediacy do not become
interstate commerce because of distant repercussions.' '
This may not be the
wisest statesmanship, 34 but as the Court put it, "It is not the province of this
Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized
system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for
it . . . Efforts of the federal government must be made in a manner consistent
with the authority granted by the Constitution."3 H All commerce can never be
entirely among the several states. Every case before the Supreme Court, in addition to those above cited, has emphasized the existence of this line beyond which
the nation may not press in. Our survey is to locate this isogonic line and observe how near it lies to the periphery of state personality. "What is near and
what is distant may at times be uncertain.''36
Returning to the Cooley Case we observe that there are two lines which
mark state jurisdiction. It is the oversight of this which has caused confusion
in interpreting the cases dealing with the federal boundary line. The second
area is not, as often called, a penumbra, but a distinct area as the iris of the eye.
There are three areas, not two. Between each of these the shadows shift causing the penumbra cases. The inner circle (as the pupil) is the commerce which
is wholly, exclusively, and peculiarly local. The outer (as the sclera), by the
same signs, is national and from which the states are wholly excluded.3 7 Into
the iris, however, either or both may enter. Both of the outer circles are, under
the Cooley Case, interstate commerce areas, and may be called local-interstate
commerce and national-interstatecommerce. Both sovereigns have jurisdiction
3

3Mr. Justice Cardozo concurring in the Schechter Case, infra note 35.
84Cf. supra note 3.
5
3 "The apparent implication (of the government's argument) is that the federal authority
under the commerce clause should be deemed to extend to the establishment of rules to
govern wages and hours in intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus
overriding the authority of the states to deal with problems arising from labor conditions in
their internal commerce." A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S.
495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
3
6Mr. Justice Cardozo concurring in the Schechter Case, supra, note 35.
7
3 Wabash, St. Louis-Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S.557, 7 S. Ct. 4 (1889). Cf. J. D.
Adams Co. v. Storen. 58 S. Ct. 913 (1938); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission
of the State of Washington, 58 S. Ct. 72 (1937).
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in the former,3 8 but only the United States can regulate the lattcr. The exclusive
jurisdiction of the states depends upon the factual nature of the transactions
involved. The jurisdictional fact is reserved for the approval of the judiciary
under the doctrine of judicial review.39 Congress cannot adjust the line against
the fact so as to thrust the national control upon the inner circle exclusively
reserved by the Constitution to the states. In the absence of assumption of control by Congress, the states are not materially handicapped by the commerce
clause in regulating local-interstate commerce. 40 Congress is privileged to enter
and oust the states. But as local-interstate commerce is a subject "imperatively
demanding that diversity which alone can meet the local necessities" 41 and Congress has the discretion, the working rule is to require a clear showing of the
congressional purpose to exclusively occupy the field. The matter is summed up
by the Court in the recent case of Kelly v. State of W~ashington as follows:
"Under our constitutional system, there necessarily remains to the states, until
Congress acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power appropriate
to their territorial jurisdiction although interstate commerce may be affected.
States are thus enabled to deal with local exigencies and to exert in the absence
of conflict with federal legislation an essential protective power. And when
Congress does exercise its paramount authority, it is obvious that Congress may
determine how far its regulation shall go. There is no constitutional rule which
compels Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may circumscribe its
regulation and occupy only a limited field. When it does so, state regulation
outside that limited field and otherwise admissible is not forbidden or displaced.
The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the state of its police
power, wvhich would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded
only where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts
42
cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together'."
381t must be noted that where the expressions of authority of both sovereigns collide that
the national power prevails. "This is not a controversy between equals. The United States
is asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce and to control the navigable waters within
its jurisdiction. It has standing . . . not only to remove obstruction to interstate and foreign
Sanitary District of Chicago v. United
commerce, but also to carry out treaty obligations .
States, 266 U. S. 405, 45 S. Ct. 176 (1925).
39

J. B. SMITH, Non-Judicial Administration of Law, University of Cincinnati Law Review,

(Nov.,

1938).

40There the jurisdictional factis the location of the line between local-interstate and nationalinterstate commerce.
41Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note 32.
The following analysis preceded the above conclusion: "The
4258 S. Ct. 87, 92 (1937).
state court took the view that Congress had occupied the field and that no room was left for
state action in relation to vessels plying on navigable waters within the control of the federal
government.

186 Wash.

589, 593,

596, 59 P.

(2d)

373.

And this

is the argument pressed

by respondents and the Solicitor General.
"This argument, invoking a familiar principle, would be unnecessary and inapposite if there
were a direct conflict with an express regulation of Congress acting within its province. The
argument presupposes the absence of a conflict of that character. The argument 'is also unnecessary and inapposite -if the subject is one demanding uniformity of regulation so that state
action is altogether inadmissible in the absence of federal action. In that class of cases the Constitution itself occupies the field even if there is no federal legislation. The argument is appro-
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A thing in motion takes some time and space after speed begins to decrease
until it comes to complete rest. Normally when goods come to complete rest
the full power of the state attaches. 43 This may be because all federal jurisdiction has ended 4 or because the movement is within the zone of local-interstate
commerce. Much of the jurisprudence has developed about where the line is
drawn without in any way affecting the principle. The adjustment has been
largely due to the modification of the "original package" doctrine. In Leisy v.
Hardin45 the Court held that goods delivered in interstate commerce continued
beyond state control while they remained in their original packages." The
original package doctrine, if it ever was, is no longer the test of national-interstate commerce. 47 Original packages are 'evidence of interstate commerce but
not the test. "In brief the test of the original package is not an ultimate principle. It is only an illustration of a principle."''
The consequence of the
modification of the original package doctrine is to eliminate the Clark Distilling
Co. Case49 as a holding that the Congress has discretion to return to the states
powers vested in it by the Constitution. No modification of the Cooley Case is
effected by the Clark Distilling Co. Case.5° Congress merely made it clear that
it had not entered the field of local-interstate commerce to the exclusion of the
states.5' The cooperation of the nation, by the statutes discussed in the cases just
cited, merely removed any doubt as to the intention of Congress which might be
priately addressed to those cases where States may act in the absence of federal action but where
there has been federal action governing the same subject. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539,
617, 618, 10 L. Ed. 1060; Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 379,
32 S.Ct. 160, 56 L. Ed. 237; Erie Railroad Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671, 681, 682. 34 S.
Ct. 756, 58 L. Ed. 1149, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 266, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 138; Southern: Railway
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439, 446. 447, 35 S. Ct. 304, 59 L. Ed. 661; OregonWashington R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87, 101, 102, 46 S. Ct. 279, 283, 284, 70
L. Ed. 482; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 272 U. S. 605, 612, 613, 47 S. Ct. 207,
209, 210, 71 L. Ed. 432; Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 57, 60, 61, 54 S. Ct.
573, 574, 78 L. Ed. 1123."
48Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 202 U. S. 506, 43 S. Ct. 643 (1923).
4'Cf. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524 (1937).
45135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681 (1890).
46Cf. Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, supra note 43.
47"The form of the package in such circumstances is immaterial, whether they are original
or broken." Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497 (1935).
"The interstate
transaction ends upon delivery to the consignee." Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 56 S. Ct.
532 (1936). Use and enjoyment are subject to valid non-discriminatory state regulation. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., iupra note 44.
48Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc. supra note 47.
49242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180 (1917), arising under the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913.
5ORibble, National and State Cooperation Under the Commerce Clause, 37 Col. Law. Rev.
43 (1937), contra.
51This seems to be expressed by the Court in Whitfield v. Ohio, supra note 47. The Court
said, the "statute simply permits the jurisdiction of the state to attach immediately upon d.elivery, whether the importation remains in the original package or not. In other words the
importation is relieved from the operation of any rule which recognizes a right of sale in the
unbroken package without state interference-a right the existence of which never has been
regarded as a fundamental part of the interstate transaction but only as an incident resulting
therefrom." That the Court was aware of the issue is shown by the statement: "If the power
of Congress to remove the impediment to state control presented by the unbroken-package doctrine
be limited in any way (a question which we do not now find it necessary to consider), it.
is
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raised by Bowman v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 52 as to whether Congress had
excluded the states from local-interstate commerce. A material difference in the
judicial attitude toward the question of the occupancy by Congress of the field
of local-interstate commerce from that expressed in the Bowman Case is shown
in the following statement: "this calls for the well-established principle that
Congress may circumscribe its regulation and occupy a limited field, and that the
intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as to matters
not covered by federal legislation is not to be implied unless the latter fairly
interpreted is in conflict with the state law."5 3 This adjustment of the presumption of non-exclusive occupancy by Congress was necessary for a working rule
to make the federal system complementary. Our inquiry is not, however, to
examine the maximum range of projection of state regulatory power. The states'
jurisdiction cases have been referred to only for differentiation and analogy.
We are concerned only with the national power. Clearly it applies to the outer
area to which the states may not extend their laws in any event. It also extends
to the iris area in which the states may regulate until the Congress acts. Both
are areas of interstate commerce. We are concerned with the national regulatory
power within interstate, local-interstate and national-interstate, and with the inner
line .of the iris area. Transactions, once only local, may expand to national characteristics and transactions national in character may increase their intensity so as
to widen the scope of national control. Adjustment of the national power follows the change. The common or national problem is as a beacon the varying
intensity of whose light causes the expansion and contraction of the pupil area
and varies the length of the shadows cast.
Where, as with us, the people are themselves the sovereign, the function of,
or justification for, government is in having available a ready agency to correct
mal-adjustments, whether social or economic, for the common good and general
welfare. This is the police power or the inherent sovereignty of government.
It ranges from the imposition of capital punishment to a reversal of the rule of
caveat emptor to venditor emptor.54 The principle of liberty of contract and
of personal action 65 necessarily carries with it a presumption of morality and
freedom from governmental interference. Under our form of government the
use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute;
clear that the removal of the impediment in the case of prison-made goods must be upheld for
reasons akin to those which moved this Court to sustain the validity of the Wilson Act . . .
Even without such action by Congress the unbroken-package doctrine, as applied to interstate
commerce, has come to be regarded, generally at least, as more artificial than sound."
62125 U. S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 689 (1888).
65
3Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 57 S. Ct. 842 (1937).
Kelly v. State of Washington, supra note 42.
54Cf. Securities Act of 1933.
55Cf. Colgate v. Hervey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935) ; Crandal v. Nevada, 6 Wall.
35, 18 L. Ed. 745 (1868).
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for governments cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it
in the common interest. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates; and its
authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass
health laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the Constitution of the
United States. Touching the matters committed to it by the Constitution, the
United States possesses the power of regulation as do the states in their sovereign
capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which is not surrendered to the
federal government, as shown by the quotations above given.
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth,
as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public
welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing
that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And
the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. It
results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances,
may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant
facts. There is governmental power to correct existing economic ills by appropriate legislative regulafion of business though the indirect result may be a restriction of the freedom of contract or a modification of charges for services or
the price of commodities. 56 While freedom from regulation is the rule, "It is
clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public
interest, and the function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the
challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory." 57 "Wheth-er the free operation of the
normal laws of competition is a wise and wholesome rule for trade and commerce
is an economic question which this court need not consider or determine." 68
"The Constitution does not secure to any one liberty to conduct his business in
such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial
group of the people. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the
policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted
interference with individual liberty." 6 9 Thus "It may be said in a general way
that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth
in aid of that which is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality
56Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502,-54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
57Ibid,
p. 536.
5
S Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 191 U. S. 197, 337, 338, 24 S. Ct. 435, 457 (1904).
59Nebbia v. New York, supra note 56.
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or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to
the public welfare. Among matters of that sort probably few would doubt
that both usage and preponderant opinion give their sanction to enforcing the
60
These cases demonstrate the
primary conditions of successful commerce."
nature, scope, and test of exertions of the police power of government. Each
exertion was to regulate the business or transaction affected. The power of
Congress "to regulate commerce" is a power which is subject to the same limits
in the commerce among the states as is the power of the states to regulate
practices within their jurisdiction."' "The incidental effect which such reasonable rules may have, if any . ..does not constitute a taking but is only a reason62
able regulation in the exercise of the police power of the national government."
"We have frequently said that in the exercise of its control over interstate commerce, the means employed by Congress may have the quality of police regulations.'' 6 3
To establish the power to regulate as a grant of general police power (to a
limited area) has special significance. Firstly, it promises to bring a symmetry
of pattern to cases usually examined segmented and consequently found unconnected. Secondly, and by the same tokens, it gives reason and analogy to the
function of regulation. There is a marked tendency, when regulatory power is
mentioned, to run to Munn v. Illinois6 4 and overlook the effect of constitutional
limitations 65 established by the controlling case of Smyth v. Ames6 6 and the
integration through the Tyson Group 67 into Nebbia v. New York. 68 But the
due process clauses operate similarly as limitations upon their respective governments in the subjection of private industrial activity to governmental supervision.
The common principle emphatically established is that freedom from interference is the rule and governmental regulation is the exception. Before the
private commercial practice can be subordinated to the compelled standard, the
6ONoble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104,
61

31 S. Ct. 186 (1911).

"It is idle, therefore, to debate whether the liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States is more intimately involved in price regulation than in the ot!,er
forms f regulation as to the validity of which there is no dispute. The order of their enactment certainly cannot be considered an element in their legality. It would be very rudimentary
to say that measures of government are determined by circumstances, by the presence or imminenFe of conditions, and of the legislative judgment of the means or the policy of removing
or preventing them. The power to regulate interstate commerce existed for a century before Irhe interstate commerce act was passed, and the commission constituted by it was not given
auth brity to fix rates until some years afterwards. . . . It is oftener the existence of necessity
rather than the prescience of it which dictates legislation." German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
(Italics added).
S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612 (1914).
23., U.
62
Chicago Board of Trade v. Olson, 262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470 (1923).
/ 6a1Centucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 299 U. S. 334, 346, 57 S. Ct.
277, 280 (1937).
/

6404 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
5

6 J. B. SMITH, SOME PHASES OF FAIR VALUE AND INTERSTATE RATES (1932).
66169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
67Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S.
350, 48 S. Ct. 545 (1928) ; Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 49 S. Ct. 115 (1929);
New StateIce Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932).

68Supra note 56. Cf. Townsend v. Yeomans, supra note 53.
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legislative jurisdictional fact, namely, an overriding public need of legislative
correction of the individual's abuse of privilege, must be established.6 9 The only
justification for legislative meddling with private business is an established public
need. The public interest in regulation, however, takes two aspects, (1) a
dependency upon a wholesome practice which must be fostered for the good of
the community, and (2) a demand that an unwholesome practice shall be discontinued. One nourishes, the other poisons, the social-economic body. Both
involve the surrender of otherwise unrestricted action. Each must be justified,
though the difficulty of the government in doing so will vary with the virulence
of the infection. All police power regulation finds support and justification
only when it promotes the welfare of the community and deals with a subject
matter within the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature. Particular goods (goods
in the broadest sense) then become classified for the purpose of regulation as
wholesome or vicious. But looking at the whole of commerce, whichever the
classification, the regulation must be for its promotion.70 The amelioration of
the whole can be effected only by the promotion of accepted standards of morality
and fairness. If misconduct, (a falling below such standards) is only attached
incidentally to the goods, obviously prohibition and contrabanding is not regulation but tyranny. H6wever, if the goods, though themselves harmless, are the
means or product of correctable misconduct, then effective regulation may comprehend their exclusion from the channels of commerce. In the exertion of its
regulatory power the jurisdiction of Congress must be constantly in mind. It is
of the between-states commercial intercourse. This is reemphasized because we
must find such commerce and that which adheres to it for potential national interference, 71 and that the congressional legislation promotes that commerce. Pro72
motion is in the generic sense of community health and not of license for piracy.
69Presumption of constitutionality, etc., of course may be implementing aids. Cf. O'Gorman,
etc. v.7 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 S. Ct. 130 (1931).
0"To regulate in the sense intended, is to foster, protect, control, and restrain, with appropriate regard for the welfare of those who are immediately concerned and of the public at large."
Mondou v. N. Y., N. H., & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 47, 32 S. Ct. 169, 174 (1912).
71The words meddling and interference are used because they confirm to the jadicial
recognition of freedom of action and private-property concepts about which our order rotates,
and not
72 for any approbrious connotation.
Here the distinction of national power over international commerce from that over interstate commerce must be reviewed. There the stifling of wholly legitimate commerce may be
practiced to effect an unrelated result in the rcationship of the United States with other inations. Thus to engage in international commerce is only a privilege to be enjoyed in the discretion
Ct. 349 v. (1904'A;
of the national government, (Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 S. Sanchez
Unit"d
Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310, 34 S. Ct. 429 (1914) ; Alvarez Y.
States, 216 U. S. 167, 30 S. Ct. 361 (1910) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
supra note 26.) While to engage in interstate commerce is, subject to police-power of regulation,
a federal constitutional right. "Persons have a constitutional right to engage in interstate commerce free from burdens imposed by a state tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce, or the privilege of engaging in it or the receipts as such derived from it. Interstate
commerce is not an abstraction; it connotates the transactions of those engaged in it, and they
enjoy the described immunity in their own right." James v. Dago Contracting Co., 58 S. Ct.
208, 220 (1937).
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There must be some underlying correlating factor in cases involving regulation for public welfare.7 2a It is submitted that every decided case can be classified under two headings of the police power of regulation, (1) total control,
and (2) partial control* where there is a factual interdependency to make
recognized power effective. Regulation may be promotional or deterrent. In
the first the means are detergent to a healthful practice. In the latter they are
usually prohibitory in nature. Practices upon the national highways of commerce
which are deleterious to the freedom of movement in a particular industry may
be curbed (negatively or positively) to promote the welfare of the industry
affected. Transactions in interstate commerce which are deleterious to general
moral standards may be wholly prohibited. Practices which are in violation of
established moral standards of the states between which they operate may be
prohibited. Finally, goods which are characterized as noxious or vicious to the
healh or morals of individuals or communities or to valid economic and social
standards of the states affected may be excluded from the national highways.
Where a commercial transaction sought to be regulated by Congress is itself
one involving more than two states, or is a matter having such a close and substantial relation to such interstate commerce that its control is essential or appropriate to secure the freedom of that traffic from interference or unjust discrimination and to promote the national welfare, Congress has power to regulate.
But the purpose of that regulation must be able to stand the test of justification
as a police method and the means sought must be appropriate. In the choice
of means to effect a permissible regulation of commerce Congress must conform
to dae process, and the quality of the action compelled, and its reasonableness
or the lawfulness of the compulsion, must be judged in the light of the conditions which have occasioned the exercise of governmental power. Let us now
examine some of the cases which have dealt with attempts to regulate matters
because of their relationship to commerce among the states.
We are now dealing with causes in which the matter in interstate commerce
was one concededly subject to regulation and are pressing the interdependent
relationship, in terms of means of effective regulation, in expansion of localinterItate commerce. Our problem for discussion here does not involve the tests
of what constitutes a transaction in interstate commerce but only in how far
72a"Many, even lawyers, are too near-sighted to observe the important implications in many
decisions which attract no general attention. The members of the Court are always alive to these
implications and watch each case with a critical eye. Cases which the ordinary observer might
con sider to be relatively unimportant may become important precedents and they require thorough
s tudy and discussion. The moulding of the law is a continuous process demanding constant and
exceptional vigilance in a court which speaks the last word in harmonizing conflicts and establishing te final interpretation of the public law. The Justices work under the influence of this
demand and they are keenly conscious of the advantage which has been found to inhere in
their historic method." Address of the Chief Justice of the United States, May 6, 1937, Vol.
XIV Proceedings of the American Law Institute, page 36.
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Congress can follow such commerce. 73 Monopolistic control is an immoral
practice correctable by direct legislative regulation. 74 Promotional regulation was
undertaken by Congress in the Sherman Act. 75 There being no question on the
constitutional validity of the statute, our concern is with its application. Unless
there be a substantial relation factually to the transaction in interstate commerce
and the related action sought to be regulated either the Congress has no jurisdiction or the word "interstate" is deleted from the Constitution with the privilege to Congress to absorb all state control. "No political dreamer was ever
wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and
of compounding the American people into one common mass." 76 "If the cost
of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted object of federal control,
the extent of the regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and not of
power.
But if the power exists to regulate national-interstate commerce it
must include capacity to protect that commerce whether the injury comes from
within such commerce or from without. It is the effect not the source of the
conduct which is "the criterion of congressional power." 78 While this is no
bordereau some of the authorities must be traced. Decisions afford a ready invitation to conclude that they commence, whereas in fact, they record established
customs. Observation of a power is often indulged before its exercise must be
justified. Many -early cases carried the suggestion 7 9 that becomes the basis of
decision in perhaps the most important case in our study, Swift Co. v. United
States.80 There the three areas of commerce were fully recognized. Things,
which in their separateness would be subject to state control, in motion were
caught up in the stream of interstate commerce. When their cumulative effect
materially retarded the flow, their bulk was retained in the national filter. 8 0a
73Cf. Washington, Virginia, & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Laber Relations Board,
301 U. S. 142, 57 S. Ct. 648 (1937) ; Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301
U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937).
74"The best element of business has long since decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud
and deception . . . practices contrary to decent business standards." Federal Trade Commission
v. Standard Education Society, 58 S. Ct. 113, 115 (1937).
7515
U. S. C. A. sects. 1 et seq. (1890).
76
McCullouch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
77A. L. A. Schechter etc. v. United States, supra note 35.
78Mondou v. New York, supra note 16, page 51.
79Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 9; and The Daniel Ball, rupra note 11.
80196 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276 (1905).
80aThis decision involved an alleged monopoly in the purchase and sale of live stock and
the sale of dressed meats for the purpose of monopolizing such commerce among the states in
violation of the Sherman Act. The defense was that the conduct complained of was local and
not subject to national regulation. The Court said: "Although the combination alleged embraces
restraint and monopoly of trade within a single state, its effect upon commerce among the states
is not accidental, secondary, remote, or merely probable. On the allegations of the bill the latter
commerce no less, perhaps even more, than commerce within a single state, is an object of attack.
See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 647, 32 L. ed. 311, 314, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134,
8. Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 59, 35 L. Ed. 648, 652, 11 Sup.Ct.
Rep. 851; Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 191 U. S. 171, 179, 180, 48 L. Ed. 134, 138,24
Sup. Ct. Rep. 39. Moreover, it is a direct object; it is that for the sake of which the several
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Modern business conditions give unity to primitive segments. It is not that goods
in interstate commerce have come from rest or will go to rest in a state that
makes conduct in relation to them subject to federal control. The jurisdictional
fact for national control is whether there is some confining influence materially
tending to prevent their induction into commerce among the states. The impediment may find expression at either end of the journey. The transition of otherwise local commerce to local-interstate commerce, in the inception of betweenstate movements is perhaps best characterized by the Coronado Coal Cases8
where unlawful control of local production was with the "intent to restrain or
control the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of
it in interstate markets." The action of the conspirators was held to be " a direct
violation of the Anti-Trust Act." 82

Where the misconduct restrains the dis-

charge from interstate commerce the test and result are no different. This is
illustrated by the application of the Sherman Act to the live poultry industry.
Marketmen, teamsters, and slaughterers conspired to burden the movement of
live poultry into the metropolitan area of New York. Marketmen organized an
association, allocated retail dealers among themselves, and agreed to increase
prices. To accomplish their purpose, large amounts of money were raised by
levies upon poultry sold, men were hired to obstruct the business of dealers who
resisted, wholesalers and retailers were spied upon, and by intimidation were
prevented from freely purchasing live poultry. Teamsters refused to handle
poultry for marketmen who objected. Members of the slaughterers union refused to slaughter. When the conspiracy to restrain the interstate movement was
established it became immaterial whether the state also had jurisdiction. When
it was shown that the described conduct operated "substantially and directly to
restrain and burden the untrammelled shipment and movement of poultry" in
interstate commerce the national law applied to abate the illegal restraint.13
Unless the nation can follow commerce among the states to remove obstacles
whether at inception or termination the channels can be closed. Without that
specific acts and courses of conduct are done and adopted. Therefore the case is not like United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249, where the subject
matter of the combination was manufacture, and the direct object monopoly of manufacture within
a state. However likely monopoly of commerce among the states in the article manufactured
was to follow from the agreement, it was not a necessary consequence nor a primary end. Here
the subject-matter is sales, and the very point of the combination isto restrain and monopolize
commerce among the states in respect to such sales. The two cases are near to each other, as
sooner or later always must happen where lines are to be drawn, but the line between them is
distinct. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 48 L. Ed. 608, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307" . . .
"Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question of proximity and degree" .. . "There can be no doubt,
we apprehend, as to the collective effect of all the facts, if true, and if the defendants entertain
the intent
alleged.- 25 S.Ct. at 279 and 281.
8
1United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1922);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551 (1925).
82Ibid at page 310. Cf. Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association, 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927).
8SL)cal 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 54 S.Ct. 396 (1934).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

capacity there would be no power to regulate. The national power adheres to
the goods which have moved in interstate commerce so long as factually necessary
to assure the effectiveness of valid regulation of such movement however wide
the field of local-interstate commerce may be. 84 Over emphasis is impossible
on the distinction between filtering and riprapping the goods and approaches of
the between-states conduit and the attempt to artificially attach commerce concealed within the skirts of a state to the foster-federal apron strings. 85 It was
such kidnaping that was attempted by the National Industrial Recovery Act. The
blue eagle was driven from the domestic poultry yards and restored to range
the outer fields for proper subjects of his attention by the decision of the
Schechter Case.8 6 This decision is in no way a modification of the principle
applied in the Swift Case anymore than is the determination of the fact of fault
for or against the plaintiff in a negligence case a change of the doctrine of tort
liability. The regulation of conduct of passengers on, entering, or leaving, a
transcontinental train is a very different thing than an attempt to control the
conduct of all persons merely because they have once ridden or may at some
future time ride on such a train. The one may be the entelechy of the other
but not until the actual relation has succeeded the merely potential can the power
of the nation be substituted for that of the state.
The cases we have been examining of local-interstate commerce have been
in regard to source and discharge. The issue is no different where there is a
confluence of streams of commerce among the states and redirection through the
resultant of forces. A casual sojourner does not make a migration. Generalization from the Swift Case8 7 without correlation in fact led to the same mistake
by Congress in enacting the Future Trading Act held unconstitutional in Hill v.
Wallace8" that was made in the National Industrial Recovery Act.8 9 Where,
however, the substantial relationship between the conduct, otherwise local, sought
to be regulated by Congress and the free flow of an actual stream of commerce
among the states was established in the record, the federal jurisdictional fact existed and the Grain Futures Act was upheld in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olson.90

Because of the difficulty of establishing that there is only a confluence of continuing currents in interstate commerce and not a termination thereof, it is not
uncommon to hear asserted that an additional or new fact must be established in
these cases. Actually it is the same fact issue that exists in all cases. Obviously
there must be commerce among the states before the conduct, itself not such
commerce, sought to be nationally regulated can be a substantial obstacle to inter4

8 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 33 S. Ct. 431 (1913); Weigle v. Curtice Bros.
Co., 248 U. S. 285, 39 S. Ct. 124 (1919). Cf. Caminetti v. United States, infra note 124.
85This will be developed at more length later.
S6Supra note 35.
SSupra note 80.
88259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453 (1922).
9
8 Supra note 35.
90262"U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470 (1923).
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state commerce. The difficulty which this analysis, if sound, presents to the
commentator is that it dampens the carnival spirit which now seems so popular
to join the hue and cry of alleged judicial inconsistency. It does, however,
emphasize the need of more carefully considered legislation (certainly this should
not be deplored) and extraordinary care and skill in marshaling the jurisdictional
facts in its support when the issue is brought before the Supreme Court. No
better example of the advocate's skill can be found than in the recent decision
upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.91 It is submitted that
this is the principal importance of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Cases.92 The
following summary of the problem was given by the Court. 93 The government
distinguishes these cases. 94 The various parts of respondent's enterprise are
described as interdependent and as thus involving "a great movement of iron ore,
coal and limestone along well-defined paths to the steel mills, thence through
them, and thence in the form of steel products into the consuming centers of the
counl:ry-a definite and well-understood course of business." It is urged that
these activities constitute a "stream" or "flow" of commerce, of which the Aliquippa manufacturing plant is the focal point, and that industrial strife at that
point would cripple the entire movement. Reference is made to our decision
sustaining the Packers and Stockyards Act. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495,
42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735, 23 A. L. R. 229. The Court found that the
stockyards were but a "throat" through which the current of commerce flowed
and the transactions which there occurred could not be separated from that movement. Hence the sales at the stockyards were not regarded as merely local
transactions, for, while they created "a local change of title," they did not "stop
the flow," but merely changed the private interests in the subject of the current.
Distinguishing the cases which upheld the power of the state to impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon property which the owner intended to transport to
another state, but which was not in actual transit and was held within the state
subject to the disposition of the owner, the Court rcmarked: "The question, it
should be observed, is not with respect to the extent of the power of Congress
91:9 U. S. C. A. sect. 151 et seq.
92
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S.
57 S. Ct. 615

1.

(1937).

93'rhe material between note 92 and note 95 is taken from the opinion of the Supreme Court.
94"Respondent says that, whatever may be said of employees engaged in interstate commerce,
the industrial relations and activities in the manufacturing department of respondent's enterprise
are not subject to federal regulation. The argument rests upon the proposition that manufacturing
in itself is not commerce.
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20, 21, 9 S. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346:
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344, 407, 408, 42 S. Ct. 570, 581, 582, 66

L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 178, 43 S. Ct. 526, 529,
67 L. Ed. 929; United Leather Workers' International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co.,
265 U. S. 457. 465, 44 S. Ct. 623, 625, 68 L. Ed. 1104, 33 A. L. R. 566; "ndustrial Association

v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 82, 45 S. Ct. 403, 407, 69 L. Ed. 849; Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 268

U. S.

295,

310, 45

S.

Ct. 551,

556,

69 L. Ed,

963; Schechter

Corporation v. United States, supra, 295 U. S. 495, at page 547, 55 S. Ct. 837, 850, 79 L. Ed.
1570, 97 A. L. R. 947; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 304, 317, 327,.56 S. Ct.
855, 869, 875, 880, 80 L. Ed. 1160."
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to regulate interstate commerce, but whether a particular exercise of state power
in view of its nature and operation must be deemed to be in conflict with this
paramount authority." Id., 258 U. S. 495, at page 526, 42 S. Ct. 397, 405, 66
L. Ed. 735, 23 A. L. R. 229. See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 8, 54 S.
Ct. 34, 36, 78 L. Ed. 131. Applying the doctrine of Stafford v. Wallace, supra,
the Court sustained the Grain Futures Act of 1922 with respect to transactions
on the Chicago Board of Trade, although these transactions were "not in and
of themselves interstate commerce." Congress had found that they had become
.a constantly recurring burden and obstruction to that commerce." Board of
Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 32, 43 S. Ct. 470, 476, 67 L. Ed.
839. Compare Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 69, 42 S. Ct. 453, 458, 66 L. Ed.
822. See, also, Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50
S. Ct. 220, 74 L. Ed. 524. The congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can
be deemed to be an essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action springing from
other sources. The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for its "protection or
advancement" (The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564, 19 L. Ed. 999); to adopt
measures "to promote its growth and insure its safety" (County of Mobile v.
Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 696, 697, 26 L. Ed. 238); "to foster, protect, control,
and restrain." (Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, 223 U. S. 1, at page
47, 32 S. Ct. 169, 174, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. [N. S.] 44). See Texas
& N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway & S. S. Clerks, supra. That power is plenary and
may be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no matter what the source of
the dangers which threaten it." Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1, at page 51, 32 S. Ct. 169, 176, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44;
Schechter Corporation v. United States, supra. Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be
denied the power to exercise that control. Schechter Corporation v. United
States, supra. Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the
light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government. Id. The question is necessarily one of degree. As the Court said
in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, supra, 262 U. S. 1, at page 37,
43 S. Ct. 470, 477, 67 L. Ed. 839, repeating what had been said in Stafford
v. Wallace, supra: "Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and
threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is
within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is
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primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger and to

meet it."
That intrastate activities, by reason of close and intimate relation to interstate commerce, may fall within federal control is demonstrated in the case of
carriers who are engaged in both interstate and intrastate transportation. There
federal control has been found essential to secure the freedom of interstate traffic

from interference or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the
interstate service. The Shreveport Case (Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United
States), 234 U. S. 342, 351, 352, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341; Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 588, 42 S. Ct.
232, 237, 66 L. Ed. 371, 22 A. L. R. 1086.

deal primarily with a local activity.

It is manifest that intrastate rates

But in rate making they bear such a close

relation to interstate rates that effective control of the one must embrace some
control over the other. Id. Under the Transportation Act, 1920, Congress
went so far as to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish
a statewide level of intrastate rates in order to prevent an unjust discrimination
against interstate commerce. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago,
B. &Q. R. R. Co., supra; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 210, 211, 51 S.
Ct. 119, 123, 75 L. Ed. 291. Other illustrations are found in the broad require-

ments of the Safety Appliance Act (45 U. S. C. A.

"

110) and the Hours of

Service Act (45 U. S. C. A. '" 61-64). Southern Railway Co. v. United
States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2, 56 L. Ed. 72; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 31 S. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878.
It is said that this exercise of federal power has relation to the maintenance of
adequate instrumentalities of interstate commerce. But the agency is not superior
to the commerce which uses it. The protective power extends to the former
because it exists as to the latter.
The close and intimate effect which brings the subject within the reach of
federal power may be due to activities in relation to productive industry although
the industry when separately viewed is local. This has been abundantly illus-.
trated in the application of the Federal Anti-Trust Act (15 U. S. C. A. . 1-7,
15 note). In the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Cases (Standard Oil Co.
v. United States), 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; (United States v. American Tobacco Co.,)
221 U. S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632, Cas 55 L. Ed. 663), that statute was applied to
combinations of employers engaged in productive industry. 95
Thus the lVagner Act Cases9" present no innovation, startling or otherwise,
in our constitutional jurisprudence. In the first place the decisions in the Asso96Ibid, page 34, 35.
96
Supra note 92; National Labor Relations Board v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49,.
57 S. Ct. 642 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,
Inc., 301 U. S. 58, 57 S. Ct. 645 (1937); Washington, Virginia, & Maryland Coach Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 57 S. Ct. 648 (1937); Associated Press v.
National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937).
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ciated Press Case and the Coach Company Case may be left to one side in an
appraisal of the effect of the series of decisions as a whole. In the former the
division of opinion impinged only as to the question of the freedom of the press,
and in the latter (a unanimous decision) it was conceded that the company was
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The decisions in the other three cases,
involving corporations manufacturing steel, automobile trailers, and men's clothing, are the ones that invite particular attention. The minority in each of the
production cases felt that the majority departed from the principles set forth in
the Schechter Case97 and the Carter Case,98 namely, that working conditions and
the bargaining in respect thereto in a manufacturing establishment do not constitute intercourse for the purpose of trade and hence cannot be regulated under
the commerce clause; furthermore, that such transactions affect interstate commerce, if at all, only indirectly, and hence are beyond the reach of the federal
power. The Court, however, felt that the Schechter and Carter cases were not
controlling for the reason that in the former the acts of the poultry company in
its Brooklyn slaughterhouse, after the interstate journey had ended and was not
to be resumed, affected interstate commerce too remotely to warrant federal regulation-intrastate transactions being subject to national control only when they
directly obstruct such commerce. As to the CarterCase the Court in the Wagner
Act Cases pointed out that the provisions of the Guffey Act relating to production had been held invalid upon several grounds, one of which was improper
delegation of legislative power. Thus, in the Carter Case, where the coal had
not yet started on its interstate movement, the statutory provisions as to wages
and hours, collective bargaining, etc., affected commerce only remotely. The
Court went on to point out that in the Wagner Act Cases, the raw materials came
from State A into State B for processing and thereafter the product passed into
State C. The interstate journey was thus likened to the "stream of commerce!'
conception voiced in the well-known Stockyards and Chicago Board of TradeCases. Wholly apart, however, from such conception, the Court found that the
Wagner Act sought only to compel the physical meeting of the two sides in a
labor dispute which threatened to disrupt interstate commerce. It then found
that in the particular cases at bar the acts complained of by the labor unions did
in fact threaten to obstruct commerce and hence on familiar principles were
subject to prohibition by Congress. The Wagner Act decisions did not touch
on the matter of the regulation of wages and hours of employees in a manufacturing concern. There is a marked difference between a statute merely requiring
a meeting of employer and employee with nothing compelled as to the subject
matter of the agreement, and a statute affirmatively regulating wages and hours. 99
Federal jurisdiction under the Wagner Act does not ultimately depend upon any
distinction between commerce passing through three or more states with manu97
98

Supra note 35.

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 555 (1936).
99Cf. Adair v. United States, infra note 100.
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facture in the middle state, and commerce involving two states with manufacture
at one 'end. The vital question in all instances will be the degree to which the
interstate movement is obstructed by the transactions sought to be controlled.
It is one thing, however to approach the matter negatively with the object of
encouraging the parties to make an uncoerced agreement removing the obstruction.
and another thing to impose the hand of affirmative regulation upon wages, hours,
and working conditions in a manufacturing plant. 100 This emphasizes that the
commerce power is as much dependent upon the type of regulation as its subject
matter. In the Employers' Liability Cases 0 1 it was thought that the failure to
compensate workers who had suffered injury in the course of their employment
in railroad repair shops was beyond the power to regulate commerce. When,
however, Congress found that the failure of the parties to the employment to
settle by peaceful means their grievances with respect to rates of pay, rules or
working conditions and that this imposed a substantial burden on interstate commerce, it had power as a regulation of commerce to compel the employers to
treat vith the same back-shop employees for the purpose of negotiating a labor
1
dispute. 02

Pauses at the top of the federal commerce arch as well as those at its bases
are properly called local-interstate commerce. In the Blasius Case'03 the relationships were of the same nature as those involved in Stafford v. Wallace'0 and
Swift & Co. v. United States.'05 In the cases arising under the Sherman AntiTrust Act and the Packers and Stockyards Act the goods and associated practices
were found to be so related to a current of commerce among the states as to be
subject to the power of regulation vested in Congress. The state court mistakenly10 6 assumed that there was no state jurisdiction to impose a property tax at the
situs of the goods while held in the South St. Paul Stockyards because of the
applicability of the federal regulatory statutes. "But because there is a flow of
interstate commerce which is subject to the :zgulating power of Congress, it does
not necessarily follow that, in the absence of conflict with the exercise of that
power, a state may not lay a non-discriminatory tax on property which although
connected with that flow as a general course of business, has come to rest and has
acquired a situs within the state

. . .

There was no federal right to immunity

107
from the tax."'
We now turn from promotional regulation to regulation by prohibition.
The term prohibition is misleading. Bearing in mind that regulation is
but an expression of the government for the common good, all regulation to be

100Cf. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277 (1908) ; Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240 (1913).
101207 U. S. 463, 28 S.Ct. 141 (1908).
102Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592 (1937).
103State of Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 34 (1933).
4
lO Supra note 95.
IOSSupra note 80.
106187 Minn. 426, 245 N. W. 612 (1933).
7
lO Supra note 103 at page 36, 37.
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justifiable must. be in the promotion of the general welfare. In addition the
commerce clause purpose was to emphasize promotion of the whole commerce
by giving adequate power to a single government of that part which was beyond
the immediate concern or reach of the individual state. Thus valid prohibition
of the use of the interstate highway to a particular traffic is no more destructive
in general effect than is the prohibition of a particular practice in connection with
a favored movement or approved goods. Each to be valid must be an appropriate
exercise of the police power. Where honest practices are furthered commerce
is promoted.' 08 Honest practices are promoted when unwholesome trafficing
is regulated even though such regulation goes to the extreme of prohibition. It
is submitted that this analysis gives symmetry of pattern to the decided cases and
that the decisions upholding regulation as distinguished from those declaring such
attempts invalid establish a consistent policy and are not mere fortuitism. It is
the oversight of this controlling principle, applied in every exertion of regulatory
power whether state or national, that has misled more important men than the
author, 109 and causes many to contend that the opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart"0 must be wholly wrong. Much is made of the comments injected into
several early cases by Chief Justice Marshall of which ont example will suffice.
It was said that the national commerce power "is complete in itself, may be exertised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than those prescribed by the Constitution," and "If it may be exercised at all, it may be exercised
at the will of those in whose hands it is placed.""' There has been no departure from these principles by the Court. It is the inclination to find what
the individual wants to find in them 1 2 that has produced the supposed basis for
criticism. It has been elsewhere pointed out" s that when these cases were decided the extent of the "limitations prescribed by the Constitution" were not
appreciated. Even as late as 1877114 the Court was unaware of the scope of
the limitations and said that "for protection against abuse (by regulation) by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." In fact the
limitation of the due process clause upon the power to regulate was not' fully
understood and applied until 1890.115 There is no longer any question that
all of the great substantive powers for internal regulation, whether expressly
granted or otherwise, are subject to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."' It is thus elementary that the regulation attempted must be cf a nature
108Cf. supra note 74.
109Corwin, Congress' Power to Prohibit Commerce-A Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18 Cornell L. Quar. 477 (1933).
110247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
111Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 9, at page 196.
112Cf. supra note 72a.
118J. B. SMITH, Non-Judicial Administration of Law, Univ. of Cincinnati Law Review
(Nov. 1938).
4
11 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
116Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway Company v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 S.
Ct. 462.6
11 Louisville joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854 (1935).
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which is a proper expression of th'e police power, and, secondly, that it applies
to a subject matter of interstate commerce. These are limitations prescribed by
the Constitution. Both are jurisdictional facts of national power subject to the
concurrence by the Court under the doctrine of judicial review. This is why
Congress is not entitled to exercise control over commerce "for any purpose that
seems good to it." '17
What are some of the so-called prohibition cases? Cases dealing with the
Congressional declaration of non-occupancy of the concurrent field of local-interstate commerce, previously discussed, must be put to one side. These include the
Wilson Act of 1890 and the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co.; 118 and the more recent Hawes-Cooper
Act of 1929, upheld in Whitfield v. Ohio." 9
The power to prohibit interstate transportation has been upheld in relation
to diseased live-stock; 1" 0 lottery tickets; 121 commodities owned by the interstate
carrier transporting them, except such as may be required in the conduct of its
business as a common carrier steam railroad;" 2 adulterated and misbranded
1 4
articles, under the Pure Food and Drug Act;"'2 women for immoral purposes;
prize fight films; 125 obscene literature; 126 wild game killed illegally; 127 stolen
automobiles;" 8 kidnaped persons;" 9 intoxicating liquors; 130 diseased plants;"'
petroleum produced in violation of a state law; 132 goods manufactured by convict
labor into any state where the goods are intended to be received, possessed, sold,
or used in violation of its laws;"' and other examples to be mentioned later.asa
Congress was given power over commerce among the states to promote the
general welfare by police measures. Proof of the fact is dispensed with when
the noxious character of the thing is obvious to all. Surely none can question
that goods which will contaminate all that comes in contact with them are not
1l7Cf. supra note 109, at page 480.
11'242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180 (1917).
119297 U. S. 31, 56 S. Ct. 532 (1936).
Cf. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286, 54 S. Ct.
399 (1934).
The act did not become effective for five years.
a'0Roeid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92 (1902).
121Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321 (1903).
122United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527 (1909).
123Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364 (1911); Seven Cases
v. United States, 239 U. S. 510, 36 S. Ct. 190 (1916).
124Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 32 S. Ct. 281 (1913); Caminetti v. United Statei,
242 U.5 S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192 (1917).
12 6Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 36 S. Ct. 131 (1915).
12 United States v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423 (1899).
12"Rupert
v. United States, 181 Fed. 87 (1910).
8
1Z Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925).
129Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 56 S. Ct. 395 (1936).
1SOUnited States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 39 S. Ct. 143 (1919).
11Oregon Washington R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87, 46 S. Ct. 279 (1926).
132Griswold v. The President, 82 Fed. 2nd. 922 (1936).
13Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 299 U. S. 534, 57 S. Ct.
277 (1937).
1S3aCf. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 58 S. Ct. 678

(1938).
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subjects as to which there can be any right to have them moved and delivered
in interstate commerce. The pernicious effect may be upon the health of the
134
poisons, 135 and obscene
people, or upon their morals. Thus gambling devices,
to suppression, can
liability
of
their
doubt
literature, there being no longer any
be barred from interstate commerce. Things which by their noxious nature will
destroy property or commerce itself are equally subject to suppression. Thus
diseased live stock (this would also fit in the previous classification) and diseased
plants may similarly be excluded from commerce among the states. If onything is elementary it is that in giving the power of exclusive control of such
commerce to Congress it was not the purpose of the people to create a sanctuary
for illegal practices within such movement or to make the immunity from state
jurisdiction an uncontrollable syringe for the injection of infection into any
state. Surely such would not be for the good of the states, singly or collectively.
The commodities clause'1 6 was designed to prevent illegal practices in interstate
commerce itself by preventing monopolistic control of the coal fields and 8Iiscriminations between competing shippers in interstate commerce. The Mann
Act' 37 and the Lindbergh Law' 1 8 were directed at both. Prohibition of prizefight films was also a prophylactic to social infection and disorder. If immunity
from state control because of interstate commerce classification carries with it
immunity from federal control, the commerce clause would not have a nationmaking effect but would have quite the opposite consequence. We have already
noted 39 the difference between the regulation of conduct in commerce among
states and an attempt to extend that power to transactions outside of that classification. If Congress can at pleasure enter the latter field, there are no States.
If Congress cannot prevent the use of the channels of interstate commerce as a
means of defeating the valid internal policy of either the shipping or receiving
state, there is no nation. It is the oversight of this seemingly elementary relationship in our federal system that gives Hammer v. Dagenhart its distorted appear4
ance and the misconceived complex of "Dual Federalism." ' In prohibiting the
transportation in interstate commerce of wild game, stolen motor vehicles and petroleum, taken or produced in violation of valid police laws of the state from
which they were exported, Congress in no sense entered the state for the purpose
of its internal police. In prohibiting importation by the use of the interstate highways to goods manufactured by convict labor where the goods were to be -employed in violation of the laws of the receiving state, Congress did not define the
moral standard of internal control. Both involve no more on the part of the
United States than that by maintaining a moral plain no lower than that o.
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the connecting state (or states) it refused to give asylum to state criminals or to
permit its facilities to be used to destroy the states instead of protecting them.
In Hammer v. Dagenhart'4' quite the opposite was done. Congress itself
entered the field of purely local production and imposed thereon its own police
standard, a prohibition of child labor in local production. Then goods produced
in violation of the local police regulation attempted by Congress were excluded
from interstate commerce. The primary regulation was imposed on manufacture
uncerrelated factually with any interstate movement. It was thus properly held
to be an invasion of the area exclusively reserved to the states and not a regulation
of commerce. "There is no power vested in Congress to require the states to
42
exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition."'
There is a broader ground for regulation than that of matching state minimum standards of morality or illegality. Much is made of the statement by the
Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart: "The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the states, but aims to standardize the ages at which children
may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the States. The goods
are themselves harmless." It is the last sentence which has brought what I believe to be misconceived criticism. In the first place, within a few months the
Court in United States v. Hill 4 s emphatically reiterated the doctrine of the earlier
prohibition-from-interstate-commerce cases. Those cases involved vicious as distinguished from harmless goods. But what causes goods or conduct to be classed
144
as vicious? It is the prevailing mores and preponderant opinion of the time.
Because of changes therein a business once immune may become subject to governmental regulation. Goods once legitimate may later be classed as noxious.
'When a practice becomes so cankerous that 'effective control requires control also
of its by-products, 14 those products as a consequence thereof also become tainted
and cease to be legitimate articles of commerce. This is demonstrated in the
Ashurst-Sumners Act, 146 and the Federal Game Act of 1900141 and the Connally
Act of 1935.148 In each case the Court found before it a prohibition from the
channels of interstate commerce of goods tainted with illegality because involved
in the violation of valid state police measures. 149 These noxious goods as any
141247 U. S. 251,
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149The Kentucky Whip Case does not overrule the effect of Hammer v. Dagenhart. It must
be recalled that in the latter, the act of Congress prohibited the interstate shipment of any
article in the production of which children under a certain age had been employed. Thus Congress was held directly to have usurped the police power of the States. In the convict-goods
case, on the other hand, valid state legislation must precede the application of the federal statute.
Commerce in the goods may continue so long as the state of destination has not limited or
prohibited the sale of goods in question. Until it does no taint of illegitimacy stigmatizes the
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other of the same class may be excluded. This element was wholly missing from
th'e record in Hanirner v. Dagenhart. The search for it is a factor which supports the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.110 It
was wholly missing because there was no power in the legislature which asserted
jurisdiction to mark the production as illegal. In the Kentucky Whip Case the
Court said: "The contention is inadmissible that the Act of Congress is invalid
merely because the horse collars and harness which petitioner manufactures and
sells are useful and harmless articles. The motor vehicles, which are the subject
of the transportation prohibited in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act are in
themselves useful and proper subjects of commerce, but their transportation by
one who knows they have been stolen is 'a gross misuse of interstate commerce'
and the Congress may properly punish it 'because of its harmful result and its
defeat of the property rights of those whose machines against their will are
taken into other jurisdictions.' Similarly, the object of the Federal Kidnapping
Act is to aid in the protection of the personal liberty of one who has been unlawfully seized or carried away." 151
The Congress has power to impose the prohibition either when the anticipated evil or harm may proceed from something inherent in the subject of transportation as in the case of noxious articles, which are unfit for commerce; or
when th'e evil lies in the purpose of the transportation. The exertions of the
power to date are only examples and not the measure of its scope. There is
no more "dual federalism" here than in any other instance where an individual
or an administrator has a defined mission in a limited field.
The subject of the prohibited traffic may be different, the effects of the traffic
may vary, but the underlying principle is the same. If the subject of commerce
is one as to which the power of the state may constitutionally be exerted and
has been exerted, by restriction or prohibition in order to prevent harmful consequences, Congress may regulate interstate commerce so as to prevent that commerce from being used to impede the carrying out of the state policy.
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goods. Moreover, the Court expressly found that Congress "has not acted on the assumption of
a power enlarged by virtue of state action." Congress did not take the initiative of dictation
to the states in respect of their internal policy, but merely sought to supplement the position
previously adopted by the states with respect to the sale of goods manufactured by convicts.
15OAct. No. 718, 75th Cong. Cf. Minority in H. R. No. 2182. However, the underlying
theory of that act is based upon the expansion of the doctrine of local-interstate commerce.
151Supra note 133, at page 347.

